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What California Can Learn from Colorado’s Marijuana
Regulations*
Sam Kamin**
California occupies a unique place in marijuana law reform in the United
States: Over the last twenty years, it has been both leader and laggard. California
was the first state in the Union to legalize marijuana for medical patients when its
voters approved Proposition 215 in 1996.1 However, it would be twenty more
years before the state adopted robust, state-wide regulations for the production
and sale of medical marijuana.2 In the interim, regulation was largely left to local
governments, which adopted regulations varying from the robust to the
permissive. During this time, 28 other states followed California’s example and
authorized medical marijuana, with nearly all of them adopting rigorous, statewide regulations soon after.3 California, once a trendsetter, has fallen badly
behind.
With California voting in 2016 to legalize marijuana for all adults,4 the
regulatory task facing the state became significantly more complicated.
California must now implement both medical and adult use regulations at the
same time, and do so within a very short time frame. If there is good news for
California in the task ahead, it is that it is not regulating on a blank slate; being
leapfrogged by many other states has given California a number of regulatory
examples from which it can learn. In this essay, I discuss what California can
learn from the experience of Colorado and other states that have already
implemented both medical and recreational regulations over the last twenty
years. In addition to pointing out particular regulatory issues that are likely to
trouble regulators, I argue that successful regulation in the Golden State will
require both patience and nimbleness on the part of lawmakers. Events on the

* This essay builds on a lecture I gave at the McGeorge Law School in April 2017. I am grateful to the
organizers of that conference for the opportunity to speak and to publish this essay in the law review.
** Vicente Sederberg Professor of Marijuana Law and Policy, University of Denver College of Law.
1. See Nat’l Conf. of S. Leg., State Medical Marijuana Laws, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/
health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“In 1996,
California voters passed Proposition 215, making the Golden State the first in the union to allow for the medical
use of marijuana. Since then, 28 more states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico have enacted
similar laws.”).
2. Patrick McGreevy, California Lawmakers Approve Medical Pot Regulations Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2015, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-lawmakers-approve-medicalpot-regulations-plan-20150911-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“‘This
unprecedented collaborative effort will finally, after 19 years, regulate the medical marijuana industry,’ said
Assemblyman Reginald Jones Sawyer (D-Los Angeles).”).
3. Nat’l Conf. of S. Leg, supra note 1.
4. See Kory Grow, California Passes Recreational Marijuana Bill Proposition 64, ROLLING STONE, Nov.
8, 2016.
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ground change quickly in this area and regulation will need to be seen as a
process rather than an endpoint.
I. STATE-FEDERAL MARIJUANA LAW
The federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), passed by Congress in
1970, has, since its inception, classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug, a
substance whose production, distribution, and possession are criminal in every
instance.5 Doctors are forbidden from prescribing Schedule I drugs, and long
prison sentences are set out for anyone who possesses, produces, or distributes
such drugs.6 This remains true despite the fact that California and the 28 other
states have enacted medical marijuana provisions that permit some of their
citizens to grow, sell, and use marijuana based on a doctor’s recommendation.
Given the continuing federal prohibition, laws authorizing medical marijuana
in the states had to be drafted with care. These laws generally do not legalize
marijuana, even under state law, but instead create an exception to state
prohibitions for those who use marijuana for medical purposes and for those who
assist medical patients in obtaining marijuana for medical purposes.7
5. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (defining Schedule I drugs as having “a high potential for abuse,” “no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United states,” and for which “there is a lack of accepted safety fro use
of the drug . . . under medical supervision.”).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(2)(B)(vii) (stating that anyone in possession of 1,000 or more marijuana plants:
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years and not more than
40 years and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance shall be not less
than 20 years or more than life, a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with
the provisions of title 18 or $5,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $25,000,000 if the
defendant is other than an individual, or both).
7. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. AMEND. XX, § 14(2)(a):
Except as otherwise provided . . . a patient or primary care-giver charged with a violation of the
state’s criminal laws related to the patient’s medical use of marijuana will be deemed to have
established an affirmative defense to such allegation where:
(I) The patient was previously diagnosed by a physician as having a debilitating medical condition;
(II) The patient was advised by his or her physician, in the context of a bona fide physician-patient
relationship, that the patient might benefit from the medical use of marijuana in connection with a
debilitating medical condition; and
(III) The patient and his or her primary care-giver were collectively in possession of amounts of
marijuana only as permitted under this section. This affirmative defense shall not exclude the
assertion of any other defense where a patient or primary care-giver is charged with a violation of
state law related to the patient’s medical use of marijuana.
Id..
See also Cal. Prop. 215 § 11362.5:
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or
denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.
(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the
cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient’s primary caregiver, who
possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or
oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
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Furthermore, the drug must generally be recommended8 by a physician for a
specific condition listed by statute.9 Thus, most marijuana conduct remains
illegal in these states for most adults, with only narrow carve-outs for medical
treatment. Furthermore, the continuing federal marijuana prohibition means that
everyone who uses marijuana engages in serious criminal conduct, even if their
actions conform to state law.10 While a state can choose to weaken or underenforce its own prohibitions, it can do little to protect its citizens from a decision
by the federal government to enforce the CSA.
Although they have similar overall structures, the laws of the various medical
marijuana states differ significantly from one another in terms of how they limit
who may produce marijuana for medical patients, how that marijuana can be
distributed, and so forth. For example, in some states like New York and New
Jersey, the process is tightly regulated from beginning to end. New York State
licensed only five companies to produce and sell marijuana under the auspices of
state law.11 Physicians in New York wishing to recommend cannabis under this
system are required to complete a course and to register with the state before they
Id.
8. Because marijuana is a Schedule I drug, a doctor would risk losing her license were she to attempt to
prescribe it for her patient; the term recommendation creates an important loophole. See David Blake & Jack
Finlaw, Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 359, 364 n.28 (2014). Appellate courts
have held that a doctor cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be enjoined from discussing treatment
options with her patient. Thus, a recommendation or suggestion of marijuana therapy is constitutionally
protected speech. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (2002).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health L. 3360 defining a serious condition qualifying under the measure as:
(i) . . . one of the following severe debilitating or life-threatening conditions: cancer, positive status
for human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immune deficiency syndrome, amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, damage to the nervous tissue of the spinal cord
with objective neurological indication of intractable spasticity, epilepsy, inflammatory bowel
disease, neuropathies, Huntington’s disease, or as added by the commissioner; and
(ii) any of the following conditions where it is clinically associated with, or a complication of, a
condition under this paragraph or its treatment: cachexia or wasting syndrome; severe or chronic
pain; severe nausea; seizures; severe or persistent muscle spasms; or such conditions as are added by
the commissioner.
10. As I have written elsewhere, this federal prohibition can have significant negative consequences for
marijuana users, even if they never face federal prosecution for their conduct. Erwin Chemerinsky, et al.,
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 90-91 (2014) (“Even if the promise
of federal nonenforcement were made permanent—which cannot be done by executive action alone because
enforcement decisions made by one presidential administration could easily be overturned by the next—federal
prohibition operates to present substantial obstacles to businesses and adults seeking to implement and avail
themselves of new state laws authorizing marijuana distribution and use.”).
11. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Health, Medical Use of Marijuana Under the Compassionate Care Act: Two Year
Report at 2 (2016), https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/medical_marijuana/docs/two_year_report.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(NYSDOH received 43 applications from entities interested in becoming registered organizations to
manufacture and dispense medical marijuana under the Compassionate Care Act. NYSDOH evaluated all
completed applications received on or before the deadline in accordance with the criteria set forth in PHL §
3365 and Title 10 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) §§ 1004.5 and 1004.6. On July
31, 2015, NYSDOH selected five applicants to become registered organizations.).
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can issue such recommendations;12 marijuana can be dispensed in oil or capsule
form, but cannot be smoked or infused into edibles.13 As a result of these
restrictions, the system has remained far smaller than in other states: Two years
into regulation in New York State, only 5,500 patients were taking part.14
By contrast in Colorado, regulations were largely market-based; few limits
were placed on the products that were available to consumers, the amount of
marijuana that could be produced, or the number of growers or dispensaries that
would be licensed by the state. But this is not to say that Colorado adopted an
entirely laissez-faire attitude to medical marijuana—quite the contrary. As will
be discussed more fully below, Colorado developed an elaborate set of rules to
regulate every aspect of the production and sale of marijuana by licensed
businesses.
Compared to these systems, California’s regulations of medical marijuana
have proven to be particularly lax. Proposition 215 itself contained almost no
details regarding how a medical marijuana system would operate and the
legislature was slow to fill in the gaps.15 The passage of the amusingly-named SB
420 was a first step toward statewide regulation, but it was a weak one. It left
much of regulation to the county level, and California’s 482 localities and 58
counties applied this discretion with varying degrees of robustness.16 Local

12. 10 NYCRR § 1004.1(a) requires physicians seeking to certify patients to receive medical marijuana to
be qualified to treat patients with one or more of the qualifying conditions set forth by statute, be licensed and in
good standing in New York state, have completed a four-hour course on the topic, and register with the NYS
Department of Health as a qualified practitioner. See 10 NYCRR § 1004.1(a).
13. Medical Use of Marijuana, supra note 11, at 2. “Registered organizations are permitted to
manufacture medical marijuana products in the following dosage forms: liquid or oil preparations for metered
oromucosal or sublingual administration or administration per tube; metered liquid or oil preparations for
vaporization; capsules for oral administration; any additional form and route of administration approved by the
commissioner. Smoking and edible products are not permitted.”
14. Id. at 2.
15. California’s Senior Senator, Diane Feinstein, famously described Proposition’s ambiguous language
as containing enough loopholes to drive a truck through. See Medical Marijuana in California: A History, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009 (“About four weeks before the 1996 general election, Sen. Diane Feinstein said what
would become the mantra of anti-medical marijuana forces. She said Proposition 215 was so poorly written that
‘you’ll be able to drive a truckload of marijuana through the holes in it. While its seems simple, the devil is in
the details or, in this particular bill, the lack of details.’”).
16. The measure was hardly a model of clarity. See Dennis Romero, Op-Ed: Why This Time Will Be
Different for Marijuana Legalization, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2016.
When medical marijuana was legalized here by ballot initiative in 1996, it was groundbreaking—but
the law itself left many unanswered questions: How would pot be sold to patients? How would the
state regulate those sales? State legislation, SB 420, tried to sort that out, but it left sellers even more
confused. Were dispensaries allowed to profit? The guy who wrote the law, late state Sen. John
Vasconcellos, said sure. Others, including former L.A. City Attorney Carmen Trutanich, said
medical weed had to be a nonprofit enterprise. The rules and enforcement issues weren’t fully
worked out until last year, when Gov. Jerry Brown signed the Medical Marijuana Regulation and
Safety Act.
Id.
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regulations under SB 420 have ranged from outright bans on production and sale
in many areas to local ordinances that encouraged commercial activity. As a
result of this lack of statewide regulation and uniformity, federal enforcement
actions against marijuana businesses—a rarity in places like Colorado and
unheard of in jurisdictions like New York—continued in California throughout
the 2000s.17 Although compliance with robust medical cannabis regulations was
never a safe harbor in other medical marijuana states,18 it became clear that the
absence of such regulations left the nascent marijuana industry in California
particularly vulnerable to federal enforcement actions.
Notwithstanding criticisms of its lax approach to marijuana regulation,
California continued down the path of marijuana law reform. Proposition 19, a
measure to legalize cannabis for all adults in California, was introduced in 2010
but was narrowly defeated at the polls.19 Prop. 19 would have gone far beyond
Prop. 215’s narrow medical use exception—it would have legalized the
possession of small amounts of marijuana for all adults, removing such conduct
from the state’s criminal laws entirely.20 Although Prop 19 was leading in polls
taken prior to the election, the ballot measure faltered in the final days, due at
least in part to strong, public opposition from the Obama Justice Department.21
While the Department had mostly allowed state law experimentations with
medical marijuana to play out, it drew the line at what California contemplated—
the legalization, taxation, and regulation of marijuana for all adults.
Other medical marijuana states noted the close failure of Prop. 19 in
California and developed better, more robust proposals to legalize marijuana for
adult users. While Prop. 19 had permitted local governments to write rules to tax
and regulate adult-use marijuana while remaining silent on the question of statewide regulation,22 the new proposals mandated the issuance of statewide
17. See, e.g., Peter Hecht, Feds Move to Rein in Medical Marijuana Shops in California, SAC. BEE, Oct.
7, 2011, available at http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/california-weed/article2573426.html.
18. See, e.g., James Cole, Memorandum for United States Attorneys, June 29, 2011 (“[A prior
memorandum] was never intended to shield [marijuana] activity from federal enforcement action and
prosecution, even where those activities purport to comply with state law . . . State laws or local ordinances are
not a defense to civil or criminal enforcement of federal law with respect to such conduct, including
enforcement of the CSA.”).
19. Merrit Kennedy, California To Vote On Legalizing Recreational Marijuana, NPR.ORG (June 29,
2016 11:49 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/29/483999326/california-tovote-on-legalizing-recreational-marijuana (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
20. The Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act of 2010 § 11300 (2010), available at
http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/text-proposed-laws.pdf.
21. See, e.g., John Hoefel, Holder Vows Fight over Proposition 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010 (“Stepping
up the Obama administration’s opposition to Proposition 19, the nation’s top law enforcement official promised
to ‘vigorously enforce’ federal drug laws against Californians who grow or sell marijuana for recreational use
even if voters pass the legalization measure.”).
22. See, e.g., Proposition 19 § 11301: (“Notwithstanding any other provision of state or local law, a local
government may adopt ordinances, regulations, or other acts having the force of law to control, license,
regulate, permit, or otherwise authorize, with conditions . . . the . . . cultivation, processing, distribution, and
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regulations upon passage. Washington State and Colorado passed adult use
initiatives in 201223 (without federal objection) and the states of Oregon and
Alaska along with the District of Columbia followed suit in 2014.24 All four
states promptly implemented regulations for the licensing and, for the first time,
taxing of marijuana production and sale.25
After much hemming and hawing, the federal government explicitly decided
to let these experiments with regulated adult-use marijuana proceed without
challenge.26 Although marijuana remained illegal in these states under federal
law, the states are under no obligation to prohibit it themselves. The government
acknowledged that the states generally take the lead on matters of drug
enforcement and that, if they wished to treat marijuana as a regulatory rather than
a criminal matter, they would be permitted to do so27 as long as their regulations
were sufficient to meet eight federal priorities.28
safe and secure transportation, sale, and possession for sale of cannabis, but only by persons and in amounts
lawfully authorized.”).
23. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-coloradoand-washington.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
24. Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2014,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upshot/marijuana-on-the-ballot-in-florida-alaska-oregonand-dc.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. The District of Columbia, which also approved marijuana legalization in 2014, was forbidden by
federal law from implementing a regulatory regime. D.C. remains the only adult-use jurisdiction without
regulations for the production and distribution of marijuana. See FY 2015 Omnibus Spending Bill (forbidding
the District from spending any funds allocated to it to implement laws legalizing marijuana).
26. Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, Colorado Marijuana Laws
Go Into Effect, HUFFPOST, Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holdermarijuana-washington-colorado-doj_n_3837034.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
27. See MEMORANDUM FROM JAMES M. COLE, DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TO ALL U.S.
ATTORNEYS (Aug. 29, 2013):
In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also
implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation,
distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and
regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system
may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to
prevent diversion of marijuana outside of the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access
to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a
tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for.
28. The eight priorities include:
1) Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
2) Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and
cartels;
3) Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form
to other states;
4) Preventing stat-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the
trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;
5) Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana;
6) Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences
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It was in this context that California considered Proposition 64, an adult-use
voter initiative in 2016. An important part of the process was the passage the year
before of the Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MCRSA)—the first
robust, statewide medical regulations in California.29 Although MCRSA left
much of the detail to regulators to hash out, it was an indication—both to the
federal government and to voters—that the state was finally getting serious about
regulating the marijuana industry that it enabled twenty years earlier.30 On
November 8, 2016, California joined Nevada, Massachusetts, and Maine in
authorizing marijuana for adult users, bringing the total number of recreational
marijuana jurisdictions to nine.
But for California, making the leap to authorizing recreational marijuana was
only the first step. California now faces the daunting task of drafting regulations
to implement both the MCRSA and Proposition 64, regulating medical and
recreational cannabis at the same time.31 Together, these acts invoke an alphabet
associated with marijuana use;
7) Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and
environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and
8) Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.
Id. at 1–2.
29. In June of 2016, the name of the act was changed from the Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety
Act to the Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act. See CA SB 837, available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_837_bill_20160627_chaptered.htm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review). This appears to reflect a growing view that the word marijuana has
negative racial connotations. See, e.g., Tobias Coughlin-Bogue, The Word “Marijuana” Versus the Word
“Cannabis,” THE STRANGER, Apr. 13, 2016 (“No matter how you slice it, the rise of the term marijuana is
suspiciously contemporaneous with its popularity in racist screeds. To that end, I’m going to stop using the
word ‘marijuana’ in this column, except in proper names, quotations, or where it is part of the seemingly
inseparable alliterative pairing ‘medical marijuana’ (after all, ‘medical marijuana’ has specific regulatory policy
attached to it).”). Although I am sensitive to this concern, I continue to use marijuana because I believe it is
more specific than cannabis. Cannabis can refer to the entire cannabis sativa plant—producer of both
psychoactive marijuana and industrial hemp. Because I generally concern myself only with the former, I
generally use the term “marijuana.”
30. Victoria Colliver & Rachel Swan, Governor Brown Signs Bills Regulating Medical Marijuana
Industry, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2015
The stringent and comprehensive regulations create an enforceable framework for governing
virtually every aspect of the business in California — from licensing and taxation to quality control,
shipping, packaging and pesticide standards. The lack of regulations for the booming medical pot
business has been frustrating to growers, dispensary operators, local governments, law enforcement
and patient groups since 1996 when California voters approved Proposition 215, the law that made it
legal for doctors to recommend pot to their patients. In the void, what has emerged is a hazy, semilegitimate industry with no uniformity between jurisdictions. The regulations seek to change that.
Id.; see also, Hillary Bricken, California Set to Harmonize Recreational and Medical Marijuana Laws, Above
the Law, Apr. 24, 2017, available at http://abovethelaw.com/2017/04/california-set-to-harmonize-recreationaland-medical-marijuana-laws/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“With passage of the
Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (‘MCRSA’) in 2015, California took a huge step towards
comprehensively regulating its medical cannabis industry after more than 20 years of little to no such state
government oversight under Proposition 215.”).
31. Rosalie Murphy, A Massive Undertaking as California Races to Regulate Marijuana So Legal Sales
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soup of regulatory agencies with authority over various parts of marijuana
production and sale32 and describe no fewer than nineteen different kinds of
licenses to be issued.33
This task would be complicated enough, but several factors unique to
California conspire to make this process even more fraught. First, California is
simply far larger than the other states that have taken on the task of regulating
marijuana for adult users;34 were it a separate country, it would have the world’s

Can Begin Jan. 1, THE DESERT SUN, Apr. 3, 2017, available at http://www.desertsun.com/story/money/
business/2017/04/03/marijuana-california-regulation-legalization/98970628/ (on file with The University of
Pacific Law Review) (reporting that the Bureau of Medical Cannabis Regulation “was still working on drawing
up [medical] regulations when voters approved Proposition 64, legalizing adult recreational use of marijuana.”).
32. AUMA, §2 I. The Adult Use of Marijuana Act creates a comprehensive regulatory structure in which
every marijuana business is overseen by a specialized agency with relevant expertise. The Bureau of Marijuana
Control, housed in the Department of Consumer Affairs, will oversee the whole system and ensure a smooth
transition to the legal market, with licenses issued beginning in 2018. The Department of Consumer Affairs will
also license and oversee marijuana retailers, distributors, and microbusinesses. The Department of Food and
Agriculture will license and oversee marijuana cultivation, ensuring it is environmentally safe. The Department
of Public Health will license and oversee manufacturing and testing, ensuring consumers receive a safe product.
The State Board of Equalization will collect the special marijuana taxes, and the Controller will allocate the
revenue to administer the new law and provide the funds to critical investments. Id. Other tasks are given to the
Department of Pesticide Control (§ 26060(b)); the Department of Fish and Wildlife (§ 26060 (c)); the State
Water Resources Control Board (Id.); the Department of Health Care (§ 26211(b)(2)(B)); the Department of
Finance (§ 34019); the Department of 26211(B).
33. AUMA § 26050:
The license classification pursuant to this division shall, at a minimum, be as follows:
(1) Type 1 = Cultivation; Specialty outdoor; Small.
(2) Type 1A = Cultivation; Specialty indoor; Small.
(3) Type 1B = Cultivation; Specialty mixed-light; Small.
(4) Type 2 = Cultivation; Outdoor; Small.
(5) Type 2A = Cultivation; Indoor; Small.
(6) Type 2B = Cultivation; Mixed-light; Small.
(7) Type 3 = Cultivation; Outdoor; Medium.
(8) Type 3A = Cultivation; Indoor; Medium.
(9) Type 3B = Cultivation; Mixed-light; Medium.
(10) Type 4 = Cultivation; Nursery.
(11) Type 5 = Cultivation; Outdoor; Large.
(12) Type 5A =Cultivation; Indoor; Large.
(13) Type 5B = Cultivation; Mixed-light; Large.
(14) Type 6 = Manufacturer 1.
(15) Type 7 = Manufacturer 2.
(16) Type 8 = Testing.
(17) Type 10 = Retailer.
(18) Type 11 = Distributor.
(19) Type 12 = Microbusiness.
Id.
34. Throughout this essay I endeavor to use the terms “adult use” and “recreational use” interchangeably.
Both refer to a legal system that makes marijuana available for all adults without a doctor’s recommendation.
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sixth largest economy.35 Thus, the stakes are higher, the amount of money
involved is greater, and the number of potential stakeholders in the process far
exceeds those of any state that has yet legalized marijuana for adult users.
Perhaps more important, though, California has for years been the largest
domestic producer of marijuana in the country;36 the hills of its north coast are
dotted with small farmers who have been growing the drug on the black and grey
markets for generations.37 California’s capacity to sensibly regulate marijuana
necessarily depends on bringing these legacy producers into a taxed and
regulated market—without their participation, any regulatory regime is doomed
for failure. Finally, the federal landscape against which California regulates is
more foreboding than at any time in recent memory. After a few short years of a
predictable policy of forbearance from the federal government under the Obama
administration, the election of Donald Trump and his appointment of Jeff
Sessions as attorney general have cast a pall over marijuana law reform.38
California thus finds itself jumping into the marijuana regulatory arena at a time
when federal law enforcement policy is as unpredictable as it has been in a
decade.
If there is any good news for California, it is that the state does not regulate
on a blank slate. As we have seen, the twenty years since California first enacted
marijuana law reform have been a busy time in the regulation of marijuana in the
states. Both medical and adult-use states have implemented varied systems to
regulate marijuana. In the next section I draw upon the experience of Colorado
and other states to anticipate what California can expect in the months ahead.

35. See Alison Vekshin, California Overtakes France to Become Sixth-Largest Economy, BLOOMBERG
POLITICS, June 24, 2016, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-06-14/californiaovertakes-france-to-become-sixth-largest-economy.
36. Madison Margolin, How Will Marijuana Legalization Affect California’s Black-Market Exports, L.A.
WEEKLY, Dec. 5, 2016, available at http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-will-marijuana-legalization-affectcalifornias-black-market-exports-7660623( (“About 60 to 80 percent of the black-market cannabis consumed
nationally is from California”).
37. See, e.g., Joel Warner, High Times at Rusty Shovel Ranch, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2015, available
at http://www.ibtimes.com/high-times-rusty-shovel-ranch-2190309 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (quoting Hezekiah Allen, executive director of a Northern California marijuana as saying “half of
my board is third-generation farmers, people who grew up in the drug war, lying about what their parents did
and wishing they were normal. And we are in charge now.”).
38. Eli Watkins, Pot Activists Have Been Holding Their Breath for Months on Jeff Sessions, CNN, June
17, 2017, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/17/politics/jeff-sessions-marijuana/index.html) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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II. MARIJUANA REGULATION IN COLORADO
Like California,39 Colorado had just over a year to implement regulations and
begin issuing licenses after the passage of its voter initiative legalizing marijuana
for adult users. Perhaps because it already had a statewide regime in place for the
regulation of medical marijuana at the time it passed recreational legalization,
Colorado was able to move nimbly to implement rules for the regulation of adultuse marijuana. This is a luxury that California will not have. In this part, I
describe Colorado’s regulations, their successes and failures, and the lessons they
may hold for California’s upcoming regulatory enterprise.
A. The Rules
Unlike California, Colorado fully implemented statewide medical marijuana
regulations before approving marijuana use by all adults.40 In 2010, when
attempts by the Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment to
shut down the burgeoning medical marijuana industry failed,41 an unregulated
medical marijuana market boomed in the state and caused the following:
Entrepreneurs came out of the shadows and rented strip mall storefronts
throughout Colorado to meet the demand. Persons considered “drug
dealers” the night before became “small business owners” by morning;
some who never used marijuana saw the opportunity to start a business
with seemingly unlimited growth potential. Soon, there were more
marijuana shops in Denver than there were Starbucks coffee shops.
There was no turning back. An entirely unregulated network had taken
root.42

39. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 31, “The passage of California’s Adult Use of Marijuana Act in
November left a 14-month gap before businesses could begin selling marijuana to recreational users. For
residents eager to purchase and use cannabis, that may have seemed like a long time. But that period is almost
half over—and for the state, which has been tasked with regulating the sprawling cannabis industry, there’s a lot
more to do.”
40. Shift in some teens' use and perceptions of marijuana after recreational marijuana is legalized, U.C.
DAVIS HEALTH, Dec. 27, 2016, available at https://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/publish/news/newsroom/11707 (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. See, e.g., Judge Suspends Pot-Patient Policy, DENVER POST, July 3, 2007, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/2007/07/03/judge-suspends-pot-patient-policy/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review). (“A Denver judge suspended a state rule Tuesday limiting the number of medicalmarijuana patients a caregiver can see, saying the policy jeopardizes the lives of the patients.”); John Ingold,
Judge Tosses out Health Board Decision on Medical Pot, DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 2009 (“A Denver District
Court judge rebuked the state board of health today for changing rules about medical marijuana without
providing adequate notice to patients.”).
42. David Blake and Jack Finlaw, Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 359,
364 (2014).
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Unable to stop what was occurring on the ground, the state was left with no
alternative but to regulate the medical marijuana production and sale that was
already under way and operating unchecked by state, local, or federal law. In
doing so, Colorado became the first jurisdiction anywhere in the country, if not
the world, to implement comprehensive regulations for the production and sale of
cannabis.43 Its regulations rightly stood as a model for the 28 medical marijuana
states that would follow Colorado’s lead.
What it developed was a compulsory licensing scheme—those who could
meet the stated qualifications were entitled to a license to either produce or sell
marijuana.44 While other states would develop either lottery45 or competitive46
systems for the awarding of a limited number of licenses, Colorado took the
position that the market should largely determine how much marijuana is
produced and by how many players. In addition to avoiding equity concerns
about the distribution of a scarce resource,47 the compulsory licensing scheme
had the advantage of letting supply and demand determine how much marijuana
should be produced rather than attempting to set an artificial cap.48 As California

43. Id. at 365 (“For the first time, a state legislature directed a state government agency to issue licenses
to private entities to grow, manufacture, and sell illicit drugs in blatant disregard of federal law.”).
44. AUMA § 26050 (showing licensing scheme).
45. See, e.g., Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., Liquor Control Board Approves Lottery Process for
Retail Marijuana Stores (last visited Oct. 9, 2017), available at http://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/liquor-controlboard-approves-lottery-process-retail-marijuana-stores (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
The Washington State Liquor Control Board (WSLCB) today approved staff’s recommendation for a
lottery that will select the apparent successful applicants for marijuana retail licenses. The
independent, double-blind process will take place April 21-25, 2014, and will produce an ordered list
of applicants that the agency will use to continue its retail licensing process. The agency expects to
begin issuing retail licenses no later than the first week of July.
In Washington, winning a lottery was just the first step:
Being identified as the apparent successful applicant is not a guarantee that the selected applicant
will receive a license. There are multiple requirements for licensure such as the applicant must pass a
criminal history and financial investigation as well as have a location that is not within 1,000 feet of
a school, park or other area specified by Initiative 502 as places where children congregate.
Id.
46. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1290.60 (“The Division will conduct a comprehensive, fair and
impartial evaluation of the applications timely received. It will award dispensing organization authorizations on
a competitive basis.”); See also id. at § 1290.70 (setting forth the criteria for assigning points in the competitive
application process: “Suitability of the Proposed Dispensary”; “Security and Recordkeeping”; “Applicant’s
Business Plan, Financials and Operating Plan”; Knowledge and Experience.”
47. See, e.g., Rebecca Beitsch, Licensing Medical Marijuana Stirs Up Trouble for States, Pew Charitable
Trusts, Dec. 22, 2016, available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2016/12/22/licensing-medical-marijuana-stirs-up-trouble-for-states (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“States that grant [marijuana licenses] based on applicants’ business proposals produce intense
competition and often bring cries of cronyism. Lawsuits pending in Maryland contend the system there unfairly
factored in geography as part of its qualifications.”).
48. Contrast with Washington State, where a demand study was conducted and then a limited number of
licenses were distributed throughout the state in order to meet the existing demand for marijuana. See, e.g.,
Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., Board to Increase Number of Retail Marijuana Stores Following Analysis
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will discover, the amount of cannabis produced within the regulated system is
crucially important. If not enough is produced, the price will be too high and the
regulated market will be unable to displace the existing black market; too much
marijuana and the risk of diversion ramps up. Overproduction means that
producers, unable to recoup their investment in a saturated market may look
elsewhere to unload their crops. The combination of high supply and low price
can also negatively impact youth usage rates—because young users are
particularly price-sensitive49—and tax revenue—because marijuana is often taxed
based on price.50
One means of mitigating the risks of overproduction in Colorado was the
requirement that licensed cannabis businesses be vertically integrated: A business
operating under state law was required to demonstrate that it was cultivating at
least 70% of the marijuana it was planning to sell.51 Such a restriction is
necessarily a restraint on consumer choice; imagine a liquor store in which the
owner had to verify that she had distilled in-house 70% of the spirits she was
planning to sell and all other brands could constitute only 30% of her stock. The
reason for imposing this awkward requirement—which led to “shotgun
marriages” whereby previously unaffiliated growers and retailers had to join
forces to comply with the law52—was security and oversight. A vertically
of Marketplace, available at http://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/lcb-to-i.ncrease-number-of-retail-mj-stores (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the decision to raise the number of retail marijuana
stores from 334 to 556 in order to meet demand.).
49. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Pub. Health, Keeping Legalized Marĳuana out of Hands of Kids,
SCIENCEDAILY, May 4, 2015, available at https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/05/150504082143.htm
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
50. Carl Davis & Richard Phillips, Tax Policy Issues Associated with Legalized Retail Marijuana:
Testimony Before the Vermont Senate Committee on Finance, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, Jan. 19, 2016,
available at https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/vt_marijuanatestimony_0116.pdf.
51. John Ingold, New Medical Marijuana Regs Now the Law in Colorado, DENVER POST, June 7, 2010,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/2010/06/07/new-medical-marijuana-regs-now-law-in-colorado/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The new law will place other requirements on dispensaries, as
well. People convicted recently of a felony—or at all of a drug-related felony—will be barred from operating a
dispensary. People who have lived in Colorado for fewer than two years cannot open a new dispensary. And all
dispensaries must grow at least 70 percent of the marijuana they sell, meaning people currently operating as
wholesale growers either have to partner with a dispensary or shut down.”). By contrast, Washington state
forbade vertical integration. See Josh Voorhees, Higher Learning: What the Next Wave of Pot Legalizing States
Can Lean from Colorado and Washington, Slate.com, Oct. 8, 2014, available at http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/10/marijuana_legalization_what_the_next_wave_of_pot_legalizin
g_states_can_learn.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“While Colorado allows for—
and in part requires—vertical integration between growers, processors, and sellers, Washington forbids it.”).
52. See Sam Kamin & Joel Warner, “Need Room to Grow?”: Marijuana-Friendly Real Estate Agents
and Other Enterprising Businesspeople Looking to Make a Bundle from Colorado’s Weed Industry, SLATE.COM
(Jan. 22, 2014), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/altered_state/2014/01/
colorado_marijuana_legalization_how_it_is_remaking_the_state_s_economy_in.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“When Colorado first required medical marijuana businesses to
vertically integrate in 2010, the industry was full of shotgun marriages—growers and retailers suddenly had to
combine forces into a single entity to comply with the law. Now, as many of those businesses transition to
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integrated market was seen as easier to police for diversion than one in which
production and distribution are uncoupled.53 Producers have an incentive under
this system not to produce more than they will be able to retail in their own
shops.
Other regulations were enacted with the specific goal of limiting the flow of
cannabis from licensed businesses into the black market. For example, owners of
licensed businesses had to be Colorado residents for at least two years54 and have
criminal backgrounds free of drug convictions;55 RFID tags were required inside
licensed businesses to track cannabis plants throughout the growing, curing, and
production process;56 and cameras watched every significant step along the
way.57 That these regulations drew heavily from the state’s regulation of the
gaming industry is no surprise; marijuana regulation was assigned to the
Department of Revenue, the agency also charged with regulating the state’s
casinos. The systems that had been developed to keep organized crime out of the
recreational marijuana, some of the growers and retailers involved are going through divorces and shacking up
(i.e., consolidating) with other operations.”).
53. Zac Anderson, Medical Marijuana Market Taking Shape, HERALD TRIBUNE, June 3, 2017, available
at http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20170603/medical-marijuana-market-taking-shape (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.3-307 (XIII) (prohibiting the issuance of a license to “a person who has
not been a resident of Colorado for at least two years prior to the date of the person’s application.”).
55. Id. at § 12-43.3-307 (VIII) (prohibiting the issuance of a license to “a person who has discharged a
sentence in the five years immediately preceding the application date for a conviction of a felony or a person
who at any time has been convicted of a felony pursuant to any state or federal law regarding the possession,
distribution, or use of a controlled substance.”).
56. Colo. Dep’t of Rev., Basis and Purpose - Rule M 309
The State Licensing Authority finds it essential to regulate, monitor, and track all Medical Marijuana
and Medical Marijuana-Infused Product to eliminate diversion, inside and outside of the state, and to
ensure that all marijuana grown, processed, sold and disposed of in the Medical Marijuana market is
transparently accounted for. An existing Medical Marijuana Business must have an active and
functional Inventory Tracking System account on or before December 31, 2013 or it may not excise
the privileges of its license.
Id. This requirement has proven highly controversial. See, e.g., Amanda Chicago Lewis, How Black People Are
Being Shut Out of America’s Weed Boom, BUZZFEED, Mar. 16, 2016, available at https://www.buzzfeed.
com/amandachicagolewis/americas-white-only-weed-boom?utm_term=.eugAa1W2n#.juevKMYwj (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
Even though research shows people of all races are about equally likely to have broken the law by
growing, smoking, or selling marijuana, black people are much more likely to have been arrested for
it. Black people are much more likely to have ended up with a criminal record because of it. And
every state that has legalized medical or recreational marijuana bans people with drug felonies from
working at, owning, investing in, or sitting on the board of a cannabis business. After having borne
the brunt of the “war on drugs,” black Americans are now largely missing out on the economic
opportunities created by legalization.
Id.
57. Colo. Dep. Of Rev. Rule M 306 C.1 (“Camera coverage is required for all Limited Access Areas,
point-of-sale areas, security rooms, all points of ingress and egress to Limited Access Areas, all areas where
Medical Marijuana or Medical Marijuana-Infused Product is displayed for sale, and all points of ingress/egress
to the exterior of the Licensed Premises.”).
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gaming industry and to ensure that cash did not disappear from the system
without being taxed seemed a perfect fit for the regulation of another historically
criminal enterprise now becoming taxed and regulated for the first time.
These medical marijuana regulations in turn formed the basis for the adult
use regulations that went into place after Colorado voters approved Amendment
64 in 2012.58 The seed-to-sale surveillance and background checks were
incorporated directly into the new rules as (at first) was the vertical integration
requirement.59 What is more, for the first nine months of the recreational
market’s operation, applications for recreational licenses were only accepted
from those who had previously held a license to produce medical marijuana.60
This again hurt customer choice—giving a monopoly to existing license-holders
was a barrier to entry that necessarily suppressed competition. But this limit—
which, like the requirement that all equity owners of marijuana businesses be
residents of the state, was relaxed over time—was deemed necessary to allow the
Department of Revenue to scrupulously vet all license applicants. Because
Colorado was the only game in town—its regulated adult use market became
operational months before Washington State’s—it could expect to be inundated
with applications from would-be entrepreneurs around the country seeking to
cash in on the nation’s first recreational marijuana market. Limiting licenses not
just to those who were already in the state but to those who had already
demonstrated a willingness and ability to conform their marijuana production and
distribution to rules set by the Department of Revenue was perceived as an
invaluable check on organized crime and other disreputable operators seeking to
obtain licenses.
One of the most important policy decisions facing Colorado was how to tax
marijuana. Although the overall marijuana tax rate is obviously important, there
are other, crucial questions to be considered when implementing marijuana tax
policy. Deciding at what level—production, wholesale, retail—and by what
metric—weight, price, potency—to tax influences not just the total amount of
revenue, but other important policy outcomes as well. Colorado ultimately
58. The process was quite different elsewhere. “Medical outlets in Colorado were state-licensed,
somewhat regulated, and required by law to produce most of what they sold; by contrast, the medical marijuana
business in Washington consisted of unlicensed retailers, some of which grew their own product while others
were supplied by unlicensed growers. Thus, Colorado was able to create a commercial-supply system simply by
issuing new licenses to some existing licensees, while Washington had to start more or less from scratch.”
Kleiman, et al., Legal Commercial Cannabis Sales in Colorado and Washington: What Can We Learn?,
BROOKINGS INST. (2016).
59. See, e.g., T.N., The Economist Explains: How Does Colorado’s Marijuana Market Work?, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2015, available at https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/01/
economist-explains-1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Colorado’s system of “vertical
integration”, under which retailers must cultivate most of the stuff they sell themselves, will . . . remain in place
until October; this makes monitoring easier for the state, even if one irritated observer likens it to a supermarket
owning apple orchards.”).
60. Id.
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imposed an excise tax on the transfer from cultivator to retailer and a special
sales tax on the sale to the consumer, yielding an effective tax rate of
approximately 29%.61
Finally, Colorado’s Amendment 64 allowed localities to exert significant
power over how marijuana businesses would be regulated within their borders.
While recriminalizing the possession and use of marijuana was beyond the reach
of cities and localities,62 local policy makers were given wide latitude regarding
whether and to what extent marijuana businesses would be permitted to operate;
localities could impose time, place, and manner restrictions on the operation of
marijuana businesses or else ban them entirely. Some municipalities such as
Denver used this authority to impose moratoria63 on the licensing of new
businesses while others, such as Colorado Springs, imposed a permanent ban on
all recreational businesses. The promise of such local control was an important
carrot to communities concerned that the commercial exploitation of marijuana
was not consistent with their local values.

61. See Joseph Henchman and Morgan Scarboro, Marijuana Legalization and Taxes: Lessons for Other
States from Colorado and Washington, TAX FOUND., May 12, 2016, available at https://taxfoundation.
org/marijuana-taxes-lessons-colorado-washington/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“When these taxes are added up, a $30 eighth of pot (1/8 oz.) will have about $8.59 in taxes tacked onto it, or
about a 29 percent overall effective tax rate.”). See also Pat Oglesby, the nation’s leading authority on
marijuana taxation, has strongly advocated for marijuana taxes that start low (when demand and prices are both
low) and build over time (as production ramps up to meet demand and prices drop. See Pat Oglesby, Marijuana
Taxes on the 2016 Ballot, HUFFPOST, Oct. 18, 2016, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/patoglesby/marijuana-taxes-on-2016-b_b_12487528.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“This year, only California has a weight tax—$9.25 per ounce of typically smoked “flowers.” That’s 33 cents a
gram, lower than Colorado’s current 60-cent per gram rate, and much lower than Alaska’s enacted $1.76 per
gram rate. But it makes sense to start low and go slow”).
62. This did not stop some jurisdictions from trying to criminalize marijuana possession, however. The
City of Greenwood Village, a suburb of Denver, sought to prohibit marijuana possession on streets and roads in
the town, on the theory that it was the owner and operator of that property and that property owners can ban
marijuana from property that they own or administer. See Jacob Sullum, Can Colorado Cities Re-Ban
Marijuana Possession Because They Own the Streets, REASON.COM, Jan. 23, 2013, available at
http://reason.com/blog/2013/01/23/can-colorado-cities-re-ban-marijuana-pos (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
Greenwood Village, a Denver suburb that already had pre-emptively banned the marijuana stores
that Colorado is supposed to start licensing and regulating next year, recently adopted an ordinance
that severely restricts what people can do with marijuana they grow for their own use, as permitted
by a provision of Amendment 64 that took effect in December. The ordinance, introduced by
Greenwood Village City Council Member Leslie Schluter, prohibits possession of marijuana on city
property, including public streets and sidewalks.
Id.
63. See, e.g., Jon Murray, Denver Seeks to Bar New Players in Medical and Retail Marijuana, DENVER
POST, Oct. 2, 2016, available at http://www.denverpost.com/2015/11/10/denver-seeks-to-bar-new-players-inmedical-and-retail-marijuana/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“For two years, a city
moratorium aimed at controlling industry growth has allowed only existing medical marijuana businesses to
open recreational dispensaries, grow houses or edible manufacturers. That’s set to expire Jan. 1, a prospect that
has had eager entrepreneurs and investors lining up.”).
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Taken together, these rules created a comprehensive regulatory regime that
put in place rules governing each step of the production, processing, distribution,
and consumption of cannabis in the state. The central animating principle was a
tightly regulated, market-based approach in which the market largely determined
what products would be offered,64 by whom, in what amounts, and at what prices.
In the next section, I discuss how successful this regime has proven to be in
meeting its goals of permitting, but tightly regulating, marijuana production and
sale.
B. Measuring Overall Success
Assessing the effectiveness of Colorado’s regulatory regime is not an easy
endeavor. Statistics are often pushed by groups with a strong stake in the
outcome of national law reform, making any attempt at objective evaluation
difficult. For example, a January 2016 report by the Rocky Mountain High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), a task force of state and federal law
enforcement officers opposed to marijuana legalization,65 reported a 20%
increase in youth marijuana use after legalization.66 However, a report in
Scientific American around the same time indicated that marijuana use among
teens had actually dropped in the first two years following legalization.67 Part of

64. See, e.g., 1 CCR 212-2, SERIES R 100 THROUGH SERIES R 1400, RETAIL MARIJUANA RULES, Sep. 9,
2013,
available
at
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Retail%20Marijuana%20Rules,
%20Adopted%20090913,%20Effective%20101513%5B1%5D_0.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review). Although there were calls to ban certain products—principally
concentrates and edibles—Colorado regulators decided that it made more sense to regulate products for which
there was clearly demand than to have those products available solely on the black market.
65. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Supposedly Neutral Federal Report Stacks the Deck Against Marijuana
Legalization, FORBES, Sept. 17, 2015.
The RMHIDTA, a federally supported task force dedicated to suppressing marijuana and other
illegal drugs, claims only 50 percent of Colorado voters supported legalization in that Quinnipiac
survey—eight points lower than the actual result. It also understates the 2012 vote for Amendment
64 by a point, but the comparison still supports the story that the task force wants to tell: The
consequences of legalization in Colorado have been so bad that public support for the policy already
has fallen.
Id.
66. Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, The Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado:
The Impact at 2, Jan. 2016, available at http://www.rmhidta.org/html/FINAL%20NSDUH%20Results%20Jan%202016%20Release.pdf.
67. Colorado’s Teen Marijuana Usage Dips after Legalization, REUTERS, available at https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/colorado-s-teen-marijuana-usage-dips-after-legalization/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
The biannual poll by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment also showed the
percentage of high school students indulging in marijuana in Colorado was smaller than the national
average among teens. According to the department, 21.2 percent of Colorado high school students
surveyed in 2015 had used marijuana during the preceding 30 days, down from 22 percent in 2011,
the year before voters statewide approved recreational cannabis use by adults 21 and older. The first
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the reason that measurement is so difficult is that recreational stores went into
operation on January 1, 2014; thus we have at most two year-over-year data
points to use to assess changes in everything from tax revenue, to marijuana
arrests, to youth usage rates.68 What is more, in some important areas such as
marijuana-impaired driving there are often no pre-enforcement data to compare
to data following legalization.69 That is, there were no measures of marijuanaimpaired driving prior to the opening of regulated marijuana businesses in
January 2014; thus, while we can trace post-legalization trends in this area, we
cannot compare post-legalization rates to pre-legalization rates. It is not
surprising, therefore, that wildly differing estimates of marijuana legalization’s
impact on impaired driving circulated in the press.70
But the problem is more complicated still; changes in training and
enforcement can impact data collection. For example, since 2014 Colorado has
trained its law enforcement officers regarding “the legal and regulatory issues
surrounding the legalization of marijuana.”71 As a result, law enforcement is now
much more likely to look for and detect evidence of marijuana-impaired driving
when making a traffic stop whether any additional impairment is occurring or
not. Given the unusual pharmacology of cannabis in the bloodstream, the
situation is even more complicated.
[Impaired driving] figures are affected not only by the prevalence of
stoned driving but by enforcement priorities and police awareness, which
has been heightened by legalization. Furthermore, even when a DUI
suspicion is substantiated by tests showing THC in a driver’s blood, that
does not necessarily mean he was impaired while he was driving. As the
report notes, “the detection of any THC in blood is not an indicator of
impairment but only indicates presence in the system.” When marijuana
state-licensed retail outlets for legalized pot actually opened in 2014. Nationwide, the rate of pot use
by teens is slightly higher at 21.7 percent, the study found.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Noelle Phillips & Elizabeth Hernandez, Colorado Still Not Sure Whether Legal Marijuana Made
Roads Less Safe, DENVER POST, Aug. 13, 2015, (“The Colorado State Patrol started measuring marijuanarelated traffic citations in 2014, said Sgt. Rob Madden, a spokesman. That year will serve as the baseline for
years to come. ‘Statistically speaking, you need more than two years of data, and we don’t even have two years
yet,’ Madden said.”).
70. Compare Radley Balko, Since Marijuana Legalization, Highway Fatalities in Colorado Are at NearHistoric lows, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2014, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2014/08/05/since-marijuana-legalization-highway-fatalities-in-colorado-are-at-near-historiclows/?utm_term=.d701aaf7a416 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) with Bill Briggs, Pot Fuels
Surge in Drunk Driving Deaths, NBC News, Feb. 15, 2014, available at http://www.nbcnews. com/health/healthnews/pot-fuels-surge-drugged-driving-deaths-n22991 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
71. Marijuana Training for Law Enforcement, COLO. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, (last
visited Aug. 2, 2017), available at https://www.coloradopost.gov/training/marijuana-training-law-enforcement
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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consumption rises in the general population, the percentage of drivers
who test positive for THC will rise too, even if they are not actually
stoned behind the wheel.72
Given all of this uncertainty regarding measurement, the inability of
researchers to disprove the null hypothesis regarding marijuana regulation—the
assertion that legalization has had no impact on important metrics—is actually an
important result. And a number of researchers have come to exactly this
conclusion. For example, the libertarian Cato Institute conducted an elaborate
study, measuring a number of metrics in marijuana law reform states both before
and after legalization,73 concluding that, while it was early to make sweeping
conclusions, the worst risks of legalization had not come to pass:
Our conclusion is that state marijuana legalizations have had minimal
effect on marijuana use and related outcomes. We cannot rule out small
effects of legalization, and insufficient time has elapsed since the four
initial legalizations to allow strong inference. On the basis of available
data, however, we find little support for the stronger claims made by
either opponents or advocates of legalization. The absence of significant
adverse consequences is especially striking given the sometimes dire
predictions made by legalization opponents.74
Writing at the dawn of recreational regulation, Professor Mark Kleiman, who
initially ran Washington State’s marijuana regulations, described the worst-case
fears of marijuana opponents as the dog that did not bark in the night.
While it is far too early to judge the effects of adding legal cannabis to
widely available medical marijuana, we do have some information on the
effects of virtual legalization under the medical guise in Colorado and
Washington. Crime did not dramatically increase or decrease. Auto

72. Jacob Sullum, Early Lessons from Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, Reason.com, (Apr. 25, 2016),
available at http://reason.com/archives/2016/04/25/early-lessons-from-marijuana-legalizatio (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review.
73. Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard & Jeffrey Miron, Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana
Legalization, Cato Inst., Sept. 16, 2016, available at https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/dosereality-effect-state-marijuana-legalizations (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The Cato
Institute looked not just at traditional markers—youth usage rates, public health outcomes, etc.—but at
economic ones—the Case-Schiller Home Price Index, unemployment rates, etc.—as well.
74. Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard & Jeffrey Miron, Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana
Legalization, CATO INST., Sept. 16, 2016, available at https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/dosereality-effect-state-marijuana-legalizations (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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accidents did not dramatically increase or decrease. Alcohol sales did not
dramatically increase or decrease.75
Fiscally, marijuana law reform has mostly fulfilled its modest goals. In 2016,
the last year for which there are complete data, marijuana sales in the state
exceeded $1.3 billion and tax revenue exceeded $200 million.76 While this might
seem like a lot of money, it’s also important to see the number in context.77 For
fiscal 2017, Colorado has a nearly $27 billion budget.78 Marijuana revenues thus
make up less than one percent of the state budget. While these funds are
definitely welcome in difficult budget times, the idea that marijuana revenues are
going to close significant revenue gaps in the states is fanciful. Furthermore,
much of this revenue was earned at a time when Colorado had a near monopoly
on recreational marijuana; if you weren’t a medical patient and you wanted to
purchase marijuana from a store rather than a drug dealer, you had to travel to
either Colorado or Washington State to do so.79 As more and more states,
particularly the behemoth of California, begin offering marijuana for sale to all
adults, revenue can be expected to fall. As production ramps up and price
declines, revenues may flatten out or drop.
None of the foregoing is to say that marijuana legalization has proceeded
without problems in Colorado. It has not, as I describe more fully in the next
section. Rather, the conclusion that not much changed when marijuana became
legally available is merely one data point that states (and other nations)80 should
consider in determining whether to implement marijuana law reform themselves.
There are good reasons to tax and regulate marijuana like alcohol rather than
prohibiting it—reallocating law enforcement resources from non-violent crimes

75. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Legal Commercial Cannabis Sales in Colorado and Washington: What Can We
Learn?, BROOKINGS INST., July 2016, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/07/Kleiman-Wash-and-Co-final.pdf.
76. Kate McKee Simmons, Colorado Reports $1.3 Billion in Marijuana Sales in 2016, WESTWORD, Feb.
13, 2017, available at http://www.westword.com/marijuana/colorado-reports-13-billion-in-marijuana-sales-in2016-8785295 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
77. Jacob Sullum, What the World Can Learn from Colorado’s Marijuana Experience, FORBES, Apr. 21,
2016, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2016/04/21/what-the-world-can-learn-fromcolorados-marijuana-experience/#6ff8e1505b94 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
78. See, e.g., John Frank, Colorado Legislators Send Budget Bill to Governor with Reservations, DENVER
POST, May 3, 2017, available at http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/03/colorado-budget-bill-approved/ (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
79. Sam Kamin & Joel Warner, How Lucrative is it to be One of Colorado’s Legal Marijuana Dealers?
(Not as Lucrative as Being an Illegal One.) SLATE Jan. 16, 2014, available at http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/altered_state/2014/01/colorado_marijuana_legalization_how_lucrative_is_it_to
_be_a_legal_weed_dealer.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
80. See Cannabis Act, a bill that would “create a strict legal framework for controlling the production,
distribution, sale and possession of cannabis across Canada,” available at https://www.canada.ca/
en/services/health/campaigns/legalizing-strictly-regulating-cannabis-facts.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
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to more serious ones; acknowledging the disproportionate impact that marijuana
criminalization has on communities of color; minimizing the violence and
environmental degradation associated with the illegal production of marijuana—
but all of that is not to say that marijuana legalization is a panacea. Concerns
about the rise of Big Marijuana to rival Big Tobacco, Big Pharma, and Big
Alcohol are real and troubling.81 The profit motive and the habit-forming nature
of marijuana for some users82 are genuine concerns that smart regulation needs to
address. But these concerns are properly the argument for intelligent regulation
rather than reasons to keep marijuana illegal. Currently marijuana is being
marketed to children, sold to problem users, and pushed by those with a profit
motive. At bottom the argument for marijuana legalization and regulation is that
these risks can be minimized if the person selling the marijuana is a licensed and
regulated businessperson rather than a drug lord.83
C. Stumbling Blocks
While Colorado’s regulations have largely been acknowledged as successful,
even by many who originally opposed legalization in the state,84 they were
81. See, e.g., Big Pot: The Commercial Takeover of Marijuana, CBS News, Nov. 6, 2016.
Dan Riffle, once one of the nation’s most influential lobbyists for legalization, now opposes what he
sees as a commercial takeover of the movement—the creation of an industry dependent on heavy
users and kids.
“Legalization is happening, you know, for the first and only time,” he said. “And it seems like
instead we’re just going to do alcohol again. We’re just going to do tobacco again. We’re just going
to create this big, commercial model.” Mark Kleiman, a professor of public policy at New York
University and a decades-long supporter of softer marijuana laws, shares Riffle’s concerns. “We’re
lurching from prohibition to the most wide-open kind of legalization,” he said. “Probably a bad
idea.”
Id. But see, John Hudak & Johnathan Rauch, Worry About Bad Marijuana, Not Big Marijuana, BROOKINGS
INST., June 2016.
In our view, any conversation about marijuana policy should not begin with a debate over firm size
or corporate structure. Instead, the discussion should focus on the types of behaviors, outcomes,
situations, and costs that should be encouraged or avoided, and how best to generate the incentives
that achieve each. Deterring marketing to minors or to problem users, preventing price and market
manipulation, assuring appropriate taxation, guarding against regulatory capture and caprice, and
assuring reasonable competition: such are the goals that make for effective public policy. Worrying
about corporate size or clout per se addresses none of those issues.
Id.
82. Is Marijuana Addictive?, NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE (last updated April 2017), available at
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/marijuana-addictive (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. Ethan Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 PUB. INT. 3 (1988) (“It is important to stress what
legalization is not. It is not a capitulation to the drug dealers-but rather a means to put them out of business.”).
84. See, e.g., David Kelly, Governor Who Called Legalization “Reckless” Now Says Colorado’s Pot
Industry Is Working, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2016, available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-nahickenlooper-marijuana-20160516-20160516-snap-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (quoting Colorado Governor John Hicklooper, an early opponent of legalization within his state, as
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certainly not without their challenges. In this section I discuss some of the
regulatory stumbles that Colorado took along the way and the implications of
these missteps for the task facing California in implementing recreational and
medical regulations in the year ahead.
One of the biggest problems in Colorado—and one California will certainly
have to grapple with—is how to reconcile medical and recreational laws. Under
the current regulations in Colorado, genetically identical marijuana plants
growing side-by-side in the same warehouse are governed by very different sets
of rules depending on whether they are a part of the recreational market or the
medical market.85 The problem with this arrangement is more than needless
regulatory complexity and duplication of effort. First, recreational marijuana is
heavily taxed while medical marijuana purchasers generally pay only standard
sales tax on their purchases.86 Thus, medical marijuana can be a cheaper, more
attractive alternative to recreational marijuana for non-medical patients.87 The
numbers in Colorado seem to bear this out. In October of 2012, when medical
marijuana was the only legal alternative to the black market, 108,481 patients
were currently registered with the state department of public health to participate
in the medical marijuana program.88 That number had decreased less than 13% to
94,577 by December 31, 2016,89 nearly four years after marijuana possession and
home-grow became legal for all adults and three years into the taxed and
regulated recreational market. That is, although they could buy their marijuana
on the recreational market, most medical patients chose to keep their medical
cards.
More telling, the number of new medical marijuana patient applications
between October 31, 2012 and December 31, 2016 was 144,138.90 In other
saying that legalization was “not as vexing as we thought it was going to be.”).
85. Abby Hutmacher, A Practical Guide to Help You Compare Med & Rec Marijuana, POTGUIDE.COM
(Jan 5, 2016), available at https://www.coloradopotguide.com/colorado-marijuana-blog/2016/january/05/apractical-guide-to-help-you-compare-med-rec-marijuana/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
86. Christopher Ingraham, Colorado Marijuana Tax Revenues Surge as Recreational Sales Surpass
Medical, WASH. POST, Sept. 11,2014, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2014/09/11/colorado-marijuana-tax-revenues-surge-as-recreational-sales-surpass-medical-for-the-firsttime/?utm_term=.267421185597 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
87. See Hutmacher, supra note 86 (Purchasing medical marijuana rather than recreational marijuana has
other advantages. Medical patients are able to purchase up to two ounces at a time, compared with the single
ounce that recreational purchasers can acquire.)
88. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & the Env’t, Medical Marijuana Registry Program Update (as of Oct. 31,
2012), (last visited Aug. 2, 2017), available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/
CHED_MMR_10_2012_MMR_report.pdf.
89. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & the Env’t, Medical Marijuana Registry Program Update (as of
December 31, 2016) (last visited Aug. 2, 2017), available at https://www.colorado.gov/
pacific/sites/default/files/ CHED_MMR_Report_December_2016.pdf.
90. Id. At the end of October, 2012, the total number of new patient applications received since June 2010
was 198,838; by the end of 2016, that number had swelled to 342,976. The difference between these totals
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words, more than 144,000 Coloradans who had access to the recreational
marketplace to purchase marijuana chose to apply for patient cards so that they
could purchase medical marijuana instead. While some of those 144,138
individuals were no doubt sincere medical patients, it strains credulity to believe
that all of them required medical marijuana for a chronic condition as required by
statute. In 2016, medical marijuana sales constituted approximately one-third of
all marijuana sales in Colorado.91 That is, the 95,000 medical patients in the state
in 2016 consumed half as much marijuana as the rest of the state’s adults and all
of the state’s visitors, combined.92 The state collected no marijuana taxes on any
of those purchases.
Another concern is that medical caregivers are not regulated by the state in
the same way that commercial medical and recreational establishments are
overseen by the Department of Revenue.93 Recall that Colorado’s Amendment 20
exempted medical patients and their caregivers from the state’s marijuana
possession and cultivation provisions. However, while commercial marijuana
producers—both medical and recreational—are subject to extensive and
expensive regulation, caregivers have been almost entirely unregulated in the
state.94 This led to concern that large amounts of unregulated cannabis were
being produced under the guise of medical caregiving.95 For example, because
indicates that 144,138 new patients registered with the state in the four years between counts. The number of
new applicants exceeds the number of current patients because a number of patients failed to renew their cards
during this time and left the medical marijuana rolls.
91. See Alicia Wallace, Colorado Cannabis: $1.3 Billion Worth of Marijuana Sold in 2016, THE
CANNABIST, Feb. 9, 2017, available at http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/02/09/colorado-marijuana-sales2016/73415/ (reporting that recreational sales accounted for over $875 million in 2016 while medical sales
topped $437 million). Interestingly, medical sales grew less than ten percent over the previous year while
recreational sales increased nearly 50%.
92. See The Legalities of Medical Marijuana State by State, MARIJUANA.COM (Aug. 24, 2016), available
at
http://www.marijuana.com/community/threads/the-legalities-of-medical-marijuana-state-by-state.171665/
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Colorado does not offer reciprocity to those visiting
from another medical marijuana state; anyone purchasing medical cannabis in a Colorado dispensary must show
a valid Colorado registry card.
93. See, e.g., Colorado Governor’s Office, Marijuana Grey Market: Challenges, Aug. 16, 2016, available
at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/16Marijuana0817Marijuana%20Grey%20Market.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
Amendment 20 to the Colorado Constitution and subsequent enacting and implementing legislation
allow medical marijuana patients and caregivers to grow up to 99 plants in a residential setting.
Beyond a statutory patient/caregiver registry system coming online in January 2017, state agencies
do not have the authority to regulate these grows. While local, state, and federal law enforcement do
have enforcement powers in this area, the laws governing such operations are murky. There are, in
short, few ways to prevent grey marketeers from operating under the guise of a residential caregiver
grow in order to unlawfully ship marijuana out of state.
Id.
94. OpEd: Shut Down Colorado’s Gray Marijuana Market, DENVER POST, Mar. 7, 2017, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/07/shut-down-colorados-gray-marijuana-market/ (on file with The
University of Pacific Law Review).
95. See, e.g., id. (“While licensed, commercial marijuana dispensaries are the most visible and highly
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caregivers were not originally required to register with the state, there was simply
no way for law enforcement officials, discovering a large grow facility that was
not registered with the Department of Revenue, to determine whether that grow
was a legitimate production facility for medical patients, an entirely unauthorized
outlaw facility, or, perhaps most likely, somewhere in between. New regulations
now require medical caregivers to register with the state96 and the number of
plants that can be grown on a single unlicensed property has dropped from 495 to
99 to 12 in the last year.97 Given that these regulations impose restrictions on the
constitutional amendment that created medical marijuana in Colorado, these
restrictions were controversial and are likely to lead to litigation.98
Another thorny regulatory issue has been the public consumption of
marijuana. Amendment 64 in Colorado explicitly stated that it did not authorize
the open and public consumption of marijuana.99 Although often misunderstood,
this provision did not operate to prohibit the open and public consumption of
marijuana; it simply indicated that the passage of the initiative did not, without
more, repeal the preexisting prohibition on open and public use. Yet nearly five
years after the passage of Amendment 64, public use remains prohibited in

reported aspect of marijuana legalization, Colorado voters have also provided the right to responsible and
limited home‐growing, both as caregivers and for personal use. However, in some cases the home grow
provisions have been exploited by criminals, seemingly organized, to create black and grey markets that
threaten the safety of Coloradans and undermine our regulatory system. These markets have emerged from
Constitutional loopholes and exist outside the intent of the law.”); and OpEd: Shut Down Colorado’s Gray
Marijuana Market, DENVER POST, Mar. 7, 2017, available at http://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/07/shutdown-colorados-gray-marijuana-market/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A gray area
of the law allows individuals to combine their plant counts for massive unregulated co-op home grows, and
medical marijuana patients can ask a caregiver to grow their plants for them in a money-saving co-op with other
patients. Both situations mean mega-grows. It’s difficult for law-enforcement agents to distinguish which of
these huge grows are legitimate personal or medical use operations and which are out-of-state cartels.”).
96. See Colorado Department of Revenue, Caregiver Cultivation Registration (last visited Jun. 1, 2017),
available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/caregiver-cultivation-registration (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that as of January 1, 2017, cultivating caregivers must register
the location of each grow, the registration number of each patient for whom the grower is acting as a caregiver,
and “any extended plant count numbers and their corresponding.
97. Jakob Rodgers, New Year Rings in Huge Drop in Number of Marijuana Plants Colorado Caregivers
Can Grow, COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE, (Dec.28, 2016), (“Beginning Jan. 1, [2017] the maximum number of
plants marijuana caregivers can grow will drop from 495 to 99 - one of the most sweeping changes to the
caregivers program since Colorado voters approved medical marijuana in 2000.”); Brian Heuberger, Colorado
Reduces Marijuana Growing Limits on Residential Properties, COLORADO POLITICS, (Apr. 5, 2017) (“In a rare
show of bipartisanship, both the Colorado House and the Colorado Senate unanimously approved a bill that
reduces the residential medical marijuana growing limit from 99 plants per household to 12 plants per
household.”)
98. COLO. CONST. AMEND. 64 (7)(a). In this regard, it is important to note that it was the intent of the
drafters to “limit any privileges or rights of a medical marijuana patient [or] primary caregiver.”
99. COLO. CONST. AMEND. 64 (3)(d) (“. . . [N]othing in this section shall permit consumption that is
conducted openly and publicly or in a manner that endangers others.”).
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Colorado and defining open and public use has been one of the trickiest
regulatory concerns the state has confronted.100
The continued absence of any place to lawfully consume marijuana publicly
stands in stark contrast to the stated purpose of Amendment 64: to regulate
marijuana like alcohol. While alcohol can be enjoyed at bars, restaurants,
sporting events, and cookouts, marijuana is essentially barred from all of these
spaces. More than that, however, the unavailability of a location for public
consumption is inconsistent with the notion that cannabis should be taken out of
the shadows and into a safer, more regulated environment. While the regulation
of cannabis elsewhere often turns a blind eye to gaps or omissions in
regulations—in Holland, for example, marijuana may lawfully be sold out the
front door of a coffee shop while there is no lawful way for it to enter the coffee
shop through the back door101—regulations in Colorado were designed to create a
fully legal way to produce, sell, and consume cannabis. Unfortunately, for many
consumers, their capacity to comply with the law stops once they are in
possession of marijuana; without a place to legally consume, they are forced to
resort to smoking in alleyways and parked cars for want of a lawful place to
consume.
Nonetheless, the opposition to changing the law regarding public
consumption has been strong. A bill to license the equivalent of marijuana
brewpubs (where marijuana may be purchased and consumed on the premises)
failed during the 2017 legislative session,102 as did a bill to permit in private
clubs the consumption of marijuana bought elsewhere.103 The City of Denver
passed an initiative authorizing such clubs, but its implementation has been
slowed by conflicts with state-level initiatives104 and by concerns about the need
to avoid provoking federal law enforcement officials. As of June 1, 2017 there

100. See John Frank, Colorado Lawmakers Remain Divided on Whether You Can Smoke Marijuana on
Your Front Porch, DENVER POST, (May 3, 2017), (“The sticking point is whether you can smoke marijuana on
a front porch in public view—one of the most enduring debates since legalization in 2012. ‘Welcome to the
jungle,’ quipped Rep. Dan Pabon, a Denver Democrat and one of the negotiators. ‘This has been an issue that
we have discussed and debated since the inception of Amendment 64.’”).
101. See, e.g., Michael Scott Moore, Where Does Amsterdam’s Marijuana Come From?, PACIFIC
STANDARD, Apr. 20, 2011, available at https://psmag.com/news/where-does-amsterdams-dope-come-from30408 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
102. SB17-063, Marijuana Club License, available at https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb17-063.
103. SB17-184, Private Marijuana Clubs Open and Public Use, available at https://leg.colorado.
gov/bills/sb17-184.
104. For example, shortly after passage of Initiative 300, the Department of Revenue – which regulates
alcohol as well as marijuana – announced that no alcohol-licensed business could allow marijuana to be
consumed on the premises, thus nixing the idea that bars and restaurants would be able to serve as marijuana
consumption sites. See John Murray, Bars Can’t Seek New Denver Social Marijuana Use Permits Allowed by
Initiative 300, State Says, DENVER POST, Nov. 18, 2016, available at http://www.denverpost.
com/2016/11/18/bars-cant-seek-new-denver-social-marijuana-use-permits-allowed-by-initiative-300/ (on file
with The University of Pacific Law Review).
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remains nowhere in Colorado where marijuana can be lawfully consumed outside
the home.105
Finally, other problems have arisen having to do with particular products or
means of consuming cannabis. Edible products in particular have proven to be a
particularly problematic regulatory issue.106 At the time that the first recreational
marijuana regulations were written in Colorado, the focus was mainly on the
smoking of dried marijuana flowers (buds). It quickly became clear however, that
many consumers were choosing to consume edible or other infused products
rather than smokable flowers.107 The reasons for this are several. First, as we
have seen, there was nowhere for most people to lawfully smoke marijuana. The
ban on smoking of marijuana both in public and in all the same places—bars,
restaurants, etc.—in which tobacco smoking is prohibited drove consumers
toward more discrete products such as candies and baked goods infused with
cannabis oils. But this created its own regulatory challenges. Such products have
a long latency period between consumption and the onset of psychoactive
effect.108 This long delay before the full effects of consumption are felt can cause
neophytes to overconsume as they wait for the effect of the product to kick in.109
While edible products may be a very effective delivery device for a cancer
patient struggling with lost appetite, they proved dangerous for inexperienced

105. John Frank, Why it's so hard to define where you can legally smoke pot in Colorado, DENVER POST
(May 18, 2017), available at http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/18/legally-smoking-pot-colorado/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
106. See, e.g., Ricardo Baca, Report: More than 15 Months In, Pot-Infused Edibles Still Confound,
DENVER POST, Apr. 11, 2015, available at http://www.denverpost.com/2015/04/11/report-more-than-15months-in-pot-infused-edibles-still-confound/ (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
107. Barbara Brohl, Ron Kammerzell, and W. Lewis Koski, Colo. Dep't. of Rev., Marijuana Enforcement
Division, Annual Update (Feb. 27, 2015), at 24. According to the first annual report of the Marijuana
Enforcement Division, 5.59 million units of infused marijuana products were sold in 2014, the first year of retail
sales in the state.
108. Elise McDonough, 10 Commandments of Marijuana Edible Safety, HIGH TIMES (Jun. 5, 2014),
available at http://hightimes.com/edibles/10-commandments-of-marijuana-edible-safety/ (on file with The
University of Pacific Law Review).
109. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Don’t Harsh Our Mellow, Dude, NEW YORK TIMES, June 3, 2014.
The caramel-chocolate flavored candy bar looked so innocent, like the Sky Bars I used to love as a
child. Sitting in my hotel room in Denver, I nibbled off the end and then, when nothing happened,
nibbled some more. I figured if I was reporting on the social revolution rocking Colorado in January,
the giddy culmination of pot Prohibition, I should try a taste of legal, edible pot from a local shop.
What could go wrong with a bite or two? Everything, as it turned out. Not at first. For an hour, I felt
nothing. I figured I’d order dinner from room service and return to my more mundane drugs of
choice, chardonnay and mediocre-movies-on-demand. But then I felt a scary shudder go through my
body and brain. I barely made it from the desk to the bed, where I lay curled up in a hallucinatory
state for the next eight hours. I was thirsty but couldn’t move to get water. Or even turn off the
lights. I was panting and paranoid, sure that when the room-service waiter knocked and I didn’t
answer, he’d call the police and have me arrested for being unable to handle my candy.
Id.
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consumers.110 New regulations were drafted dealing with a number of issues
regarding edibles: new regulations placed limits on the total amount of THC a
single edible package could contain; required that individual dosages be clearly
marked; banned shapes and colors that appeal to small children; and imposed a
requirement marijuana edibles be identifiable as such even once they left their
original packaging.
That all of these new regulations were needed to respond to initial gaps or
omissions in regulation is not (necessarily) an indictment of the original rules that
were put in place. Rather, they were an acknowledgment that even a thoughtful
process entered into in good faith by a representative group of stakeholders could
nonetheless fail to anticipate conditions on the ground. Colorado regulators had
essentially no experience with the operation of a legal marijuana market and
there were bound to be unintended consequences of their actions. In fact, one of
the takeaways for California from the Colorado experience is that exactly this
kind of nimbleness and flexibility are necessary to any functioning regulatory
system.
III. CONCLUSION: WHAT THIS ALL MEANS FOR CALIFORNIA
Despite the fact that marijuana regulation has proceeded relatively smoothly
in Colorado—as well as the other states where regulations are in place – there is
no doubting that the task facing California is a daunting one. Fortunately,
California does not write upon a blank slate. The experience of Colorado, in
particular, has already informed California many ways. The Blue Ribbon
Commission that Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom established to formulate
best practices for the regulation of marijuana drew heavily on the experience of
Colorado’s own Task force to implement Amendment 64.111 Furthermore,
Proposition 64 borrowed more than just its number and its name from Colorado’s
Amendment 64, An Initiative to Tax and Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol.
Many of the provisions of the Proposition 64—the limits on possession and
cultivation, the permitting of vertical integration (prohibited under the MCRSA),
the granting of priority to existing medical producers, and criminal background
checks for licensees—can be found as well in Amendment 64 but not in
California’s previous attempt at recreational legalization, Proposition 19.
I close by highlighting a few of the other lessons that California can draw
from the way implementation has proceeded in Colorado. The first has to do with
the interplay between medical and recreational regulations. On April 2, 2017,
California Governor Jerry Brown released a 79-page report, setting forth a
110. Robert Glatter, The Hidden Danger of Marijuana Edibles, FORBES (Jul. 27, 2015), available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertglatter/2015/07/27/the-hidden-danger-of-marijuana-edibles/#67427fd77f72
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
111. I served as a member of both bodies.
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number of proposals to harmonize ambiguous or inconsistent terms of the
MCRSA and AUMA.112 The document suggests the establishment of a dual
regulatory system, whereby separate rules are set forth for the medical and
recreational markets: “While many components of the regulatory structure are
proposed to be harmonized, the administration proposes to preserve the integrity
and separation of the medicinal and adult use industry by maintaining these as
two separate categories of license types with the same regulatory requirements
for each.”113 As discussed above, there are legitimate concerns about the
operation of parallel systems for the regulation of recreational and medical
marijuana. In particular, to the extent the medical system is more porous (and
lower taxed) than the recreational system, it will undercut many of the policy
goals of recreational regulation.
This is likely unavoidable, however, at least for now. Proposition 64 did not
repeal most previously existing medical marijuana provisions. It was clearly not
the intent of the voters to repeal the medical system and replace it with a
recreational one; the two were meant to exist side-by-side. Nonetheless, a better
long-term solution would probably entail a single-stream regulatory system with
accommodation made for sincere medical patients. So, for example, a single tax
and regulate regime could be produced to govern all marijuana grown and sold in
California, with medical patients exempted from taxes imposed in the
recreational marketplace and perhaps granted other accommodations such as
more concentrated products or higher purchase limits.114 This solution, however,
would likely anger medical patients who were already worried about the changes
that recreational marijuana will bring to the existing medical market.115 There is
concern that the recreational market will have little incentive to create the kinds
of products—particularly those high in non-psychotropic CBD—that medical
patients require and may generate a backlash against all marijuana law reform.
So long as there are separate systems for medical and recreational marijuana,
moreover, and so long as the tax rates for those two markets differ, there will
always be an incentive for regular users to avoid the recreational system and seek

112. Department of Consumer Affairs, Bureau of Cannabis Control Proposed Trailer Bill Legislation
(Apr. 2, 2017), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/Budget/Trailer_Bill_Language/documents/200Cannabis
RegulationDraft.pdf.
113. Id. at 2.
114. Proposition 64 accomplishes this in part by exempting medical patients from a 7.5% sales tax on
marijuana, but not the 15% excise tax or $9.25/ounce cultivation tax.
115. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, The Push to Legalize Pot for All Has Deeply Divided the Medical
Marijuana Community, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2016, available at http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-caproposition-64-recreational-pot-opponents-20161004-snap-story.html (on file with The University of Pacific
Law Review). (“Proposition 64 has split the medical cannabis community, with some seeing new opportunity
and others fearing it will wreck a system that is working for nearly 800,000 medical pot card holders.” A pool
of medical marijuana producers showed that 31% supported Proposition 64, 31% opposed it, and 38% were
undecided).
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refuge in the medical marketplace. With an estimated one and a half million
Californians already holding marijuana cards, this could significantly cut into tax
revenue.116 In the interim, then, California will have to engage in the same
delicate balance that Colorado has engaged in, attempting to close the medical
loophole without running afoul of rights and expectations that have been created
by the state’s medical marijuana laws.
Vertical integration is another issue that is already proving contentious in
California. Marijuana states vary widely in their approach to the question: While
Colorado initially required that marijuana businesses be vertically integrated,
Washington State adopted a three-tier distribution model based on the system of
alcohol distribution that explicitly prohibited vertical integration.117 California
law already reflects this schizophrenia: Proposition 64 permits vertical
integration while MCRSA largely prohibited it. Something, obviously, must give.
In his April 2nd proposal, Governor Brown proposed adopting AUMA’s
provisions over those of MCRSA, allowing license holders to combine all types
of licenses except testing.118 This recommendation has drawn immediate fire
from many in the state.119 The concern is that vertical integration increases the
market power of the few entities able to acquire multiple licenses. For this
reason, even some medical marijuana growers’ associations have expressed
concern about vertical integration.120 One protection against the acquisition of
such monopolistic power is the phased rollout of production licenses, with the

116. Of course, because registration with the state is optional, no one knows exactly how many
Californians have medical marijuana cards. Nonetheless, the Marijuana Policy Project estimates 1.125 million
cardholders based on registry rates in other states. See Marijuana Policy Project, Medical Marijuana Patient
Numbers (last visited June 1, 2017), available at https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/state-by-statemedical-marijuana-laws/medical-marijuana-patient-numbers/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review)
117. For a discussion of the pros and cons of each method, see, e.g., Jonathan Caulkins, et al.,
Considering Marijuana Legalization: Insights for Vermont and Other Jurisdictions, RAND, 2015 at 111-12
(“Vertical integration is ordinarily banned in the alcohol business in the United States. One argument against
vertical integration is that concentrated economic power will lead to political power and effective lobbying to
the benefit of the industry and to the detriment of public health. Proponents of a vertical integration argue that
banning it is likely to result in inefficient and costly operations. However, some people who focus on protecting
public health see inflating retail prices via this inefficiency as a feature, not a bug, for the long run.”).
118. See Trailer Bill at 3. Obviously, testing licensees cannot compete with those cultivators,
manufacturers, and retailers whose products they test.
119. See, e.g., Taryn Luna, Jerry Brown Wades Into Pot Battle with Plan to Merge Medical, Recreational
Marijuana, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 5, 2017, (reporting opposition from the Teamsters union to the governor’s
decision to allow vertical integration.); Michael R. Blood and Paul Elias, California Police Not Down with
Gov. Brown’s Marijuana Plan, THE CANNABIST, Apr. 6, 2017, (“Proposition 64 has split the medical cannabis
community, with some seeing new opportunity and others fearing it will wreck a system that is working for
nearly 800,000 medical pot card holders.” A pool of medical marijuana producers showed that 31% supported
Proposition 64, 31% opposed it, and 38% were undecided).
120. See id. (“Hezekiah Allen, head of the California Growers Association, also said his organization has
concerns with the elimination of the multiple licenses prohibition. ‘It could lead to mega-manufactures and
mega-chain stores,’ Allen said.”).
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largest production facilities not coming online until 2023.121 The fact that
economies of scale will not be fully realized for several years, and that
Proposition 64 makes provision for small, “microbusiness” licenses creates the
possibility of a more diverse market and helps temper fears of a Big Marijuana
industry springing up overnight.122 In this regard, California’s wine industry—
which abuts the marijuana growing regions of the state—provides some hope.
Although there are a few large producers who create cheap, mass-consumed
wines, there are also successful artisanal producers who are able to make a living
(and charge a premium) for a more hand-crafted product.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the importance of enforcement. The
regulation of marijuana is expensive and time-consuming. It asks a lot of both
regulators and the regulated. If California implements a robust regulatory regime,
it will be crucial to the functioning of that regime that it covers as much
marijuana produced in the state as possible. If the state’s currently existing
marijuana growers do not switch from the black and grey markets where they
currently ply their trade to the regulated market, the entire regulatory apparatus in
California will likely fail. The problem of regulatory compliance can only be
solved if law-abiding growers are confident that their neighbors are also subject
to the costs and complications of regulation. The collective action problem that is
created will create incentives for complying producers to report those who are
not in compliance; a grower paying licensing fees, taxes, and regulatory costs
simply cannot compete with a neighbor who is not. In Colorado, a hotline the
Department of Revenue instituted a hotline for regulated businesses to call in
order to report noncompliant ones.123
There is no doubt that this norm will be difficult to instill in the hills of
Northern California. The anti-authoritarian spirit runs deep there. There is
antipathy toward the regulation of marijuana as a business and a distrust of
government and its agents. These concerns are not paranoia. Many of the growers
in these hills have been to prison or seen their family and friends sent there. But
the dirty secret of marijuana law reform is that it is not the end of government’s
interest in marijuana production and sale; it only signals a shift from a criminal
model to a regulatory one. While marijuana growers are unlikely to report their
neighbors if doing so would lead to their arrest and conviction, they might be
willing to do so if the consequence were that they no longer had to compete with
others not bearing the burden of regulatory compliance. A regulatory regime will
have to be constructed that enables that to happen.
121. So-called Type 5 licenses—outdoor farms of more than an acre—will not be available until the year
2023. See Proposition 64§ 26061(d).
122. See Proposition 64§ 26070(a)(3).
123. See Contact Us—Marijuana Enforcement, Colo. Dep't. of Rev., Marijuana Enforcement Division,
available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/contact-us-marijuana-enforcement (on file with The
University of Pacific Law Review).
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In the time and space I have, it would be impossible to catalog the challenges
facing California. They are monumental. Rather, I have hoped to flag a few
examples and to offer a few insights from what Colorado has experienced. Even
with this experience, it would be unrealistic to expect California regulators and
lawmakers to get this task right the first time. Rather, the final takeaway is that it
makes more sense to see regulation as a process rather than a one-time endeavor.
With patience and determination, however, California has the opportunity once
again to become a leader in the area of marijuana law reform.
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